Introduction

BERNARDO ZULETA*

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is,
it seems, approaching the end of an arduous journey. At the resumed eighth session of the Conference, which was held last
summer in New York, the Conference accepted a programme of
work which envisaged the adoption of the proposed convention on
the law of the sea at the end of the resumed ninth session to be
held in July and August this year.
SOME FEATURES OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
THE LAw OF THE SEA

It is timely to take a look at some of the unique features of this
important international conference which, it may be pointed out,
is concerned with some of the more challenging issues facing the
international community. This Conference has been engaged in
law-making with respect to issues which are, for the most part, of
a fundamentally political nature and have been thus perceived by
the majority of the participants even from the outset. That was
the reason, in the first place, that the item concerning the peaceful uses of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction was in fact allocated to the First Committee' and that the preparation of the
2
Conference was entrusted to a political, and not a juridical, body.
It was realized that in order to "co-ordinate the wills" of States
with such widely divergent interests on issues of such paramount
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political importance there could be no easy resort to voting.3 That
is why, of course, it is the notion of consensus which constitutes
the leit-motiv of the rules of procedure of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This notion was, in fact,
embodied in the Declaration incorporating the "Gentleman's
Agreement" which is appended to the rules of procedure. This
agreement declared, among other things, that the Conference
should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no voting on such
matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.
This principle which represents, as it were, the spirit of the
Conference is reflected in certain important provisions of the
rules of procedure themselves. One example is the provision
which states that before a matter of substance is put to the vote, a
determination that all efforts at reaching general agreement have
been exhausted shall be made; and another example is the procedure whereby the question of taking a vote on any matter of substance can be deferred for a specified period of time.
It should be noted that the concept of consensus applies not
only to the decision-making process whereby the convention will
be adopted but has been applied in practice to almost every step
taken by the Conference towards that end.
This Conference has been obliged to devise a unique working
pattern. Factors such as the complexity of the issues facing the
Conference, the sharp conflict of interest on certain important
questions, the fact that differences of opinion often cut across the
lines of the usual regional groupings, and the large number of
delegations participating in the Conference have had significant
consequences on the type of procedures which the Conference
found itself almost compelled to adopt. The major consequence of
these circumstances, in the first place, was that negotiations could
not be effectively carried out in formal proceedings. Indeed most
of the work of the Conference has been carried out in informal
meetings. In the second place, several issues facing the Conference are not suitable for negotiation among large numbers of
delegations. 4 Thus it was that much of the work of the Conference was conducted in several small negotiating groups. At the
same time, since delegations are understandably reluctant to entrust their interests to representatives from other countries, a
procedure had to be devised to enable all countries to have a say
in the final product. This has been done by ensuring that any
3. See Tunkin, International Law in the International System, 4 HAGUE
RECUML DES Corms 1, 16-22, 116-18 "(1975).

4. 4 U.N. GAOR 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR/SR 7-13 (1975).
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agreements reached in smaller groups are considered by bodies
of the Conference on which all States are represented, and that
consensus will always be sought among all participants in the
Conference.5
Given the fact that the preparation of the Conference was entrusted to a political body, it was not surprising that when it initiated its work, it had no draft articles, as such, before it.
Consequently there was need for a basic working document
around which negotiations could be centered. The first step towards that goal took place at the second session of the Conference when the Second Committee produced the so-called "Main
Trends" paper. At the third session in 1975, the Conference endorsed the President's proposal that a single negotiating text
should be prepared by the Chairmen of the three Committees.
This informal single negotiating text formed the basis for negotiations at the fourth session, and from this emerged the Revised
Single Negotiating Text. At its sixth session in 1977 the Conference decided to consolidate the various parts of the Revised Single Negotiating Text. With the appearance of this consolidated
text-the Informal Composite Negotiating Text-it can fairly be
said that the Conference reached a milestone in its search for a
basic negotiating text. It must, of course, be observed that these
texts were informal and were not designed to prejudice the position of any delegation and did not represent any negotiated text
or accepted compromise. The emergence of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text threw into relief the so-called "hard-core
6
issues."
5. For a fairly effective solution to this problem, see 10 U.N. GAOR 6, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (1978).
6. 10 U.N. GAOR 29, U.N. Doc. A/COI!F.62/62 (1978). These issues were:
1. System of exploration and exploitation and resource policy, taking
note of the work of the informal group of technical experts invited to consider the technical problems associated with any formula that might be
used to limit production of minerals from the area, chaired by a member
of the United Kingdom delegation.
2. Financial arrangements...
3. Organs of the Authority, their composition, powers and functions.
4. Right of access of land-locked States and certain developing coastal
States in a subregion or region to the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Right of access of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States to the living resources of the economic zone.
5. The question of the settlement of disputes relating to the exercise of
the sovereign rights of coastal States in the exclusive economic zone.
6. Definition of the outer limits of the Continental Shelf and the question of Payments and Contributions with respect to the exploitation of the

This text was revised at the end of the first part of the eighth
session held at Geneva in 1979. The mechanism for the revision
of the text differed in some important respects from that adopted
for the compilation of the preceding informal negotiating texts.
The guiding principle for this revision was that any modifications
or revisions of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text should
emerge from the negotiations and should not be introduced by
any single person, whether it be the President or a Chairman of a
Committee, unless presented to the Plenary and found, from the
widespread and substantial support prevailing in Plenary, to offer
7
a substantially improved prospect of a consensus.
It was further added that the revision of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text was to be the collective responsibility of the
President and the Chairmen of the Main Committees, acting together as a team headed by the President. The Chairman of the
Drafting Committee and the Rapporteur-General should be associated with the team as the former should be fully aware of the
considerations that determined any revision and the latter should,
ex officio, be kept informed of the manner in which the Conference has proceeded at all states.8
The point has been made that for the purpose of revising the
text the "sense of the House," i.e. the Plenary, could not be determined otherwise than by the presidential team. In fact, both the
first and second revisions of the Informal Composite Negotiating
Text were carried out by this team. 9
THE REFORM OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

The mandate of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea is to adopt a convention dealing with all matters
relating to the law of the sea. This objective has not yet been
achieved. Nevertheless this Conference is already exercising a
significant impact on the development of the law of the sea and is
undoubtedly moulding the structure of the new maritime law. In
this respect the Conference is already reforming, so to speak, the
law of the sea.10 This reform is particularly evident in certain areas of the law. For instance, there seems to be general agreement
Continental Shelf beyond 200 miles. Definition of the outer limits of the
Continental Shelf and the question of revenue sharing.
7. Delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent and opposite

States and settlement of disputes thereon.
7. 10 U.N. GAOR 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (1978).
8. Id.
9. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/88 (1979).

10. Guy de Lacharriere, Les Travaux de la Confirence du Droit de la Mer,
DtF5ENS. NATiONALE 9-20 (1978).
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at the Conference on a breadth of twelve miles for the territorial
sea and many members of the international community hold that
a 12-mile territorial sea now forms part of international customary
law.
There still remains some controversy about the precise juridical
status of the new concept of the exclusive economic zone in
which coastal States exercise broad rights over all resources.
Nevertheless, the general support which this concept has attracted at the Conference has resulted in several coastal Statesdeveloping as well as developed-establishing such zones in their
national legislation. Indeed the very language of the negotiating
text of the Conference has been used in the maritime legislation
of certain coastal States. In fact over half of the 130 coastal States
have already made 200-mile claims and most of these claims have
come into existence since 1974. Moreover the network of bilateral
fishing agreements concluded as a consequence of the new r6gime of the oceans"1 is further evidence of coastal State practice
on this issue. The conclusion seems inescapable that the Conference, in spite of the fact that its formal mandate has not yet been
discharged, has exerted a significant influence on the maritime
practice of States, especially with regard to maritime zones falling
within national jurisdiction.
THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA

It is by now well known that one of the most controversial issues facing the Conference concerns the creation of a generally
acceptable international legal regime for the deep sea-bed. The
origin of the controversy springs directly from the conflict of interests, and perhaps even of ideologies, between the Group of 77
and the highly developed industrialized world. What is perhaps
not sufficiently appreciated is the fact that the prospect for reaching agreement between the two protagonists on some significant
issues has been much improved.
The "parallel system" represents a significant compromise between those who supported a strong International Seabed Authority with exclusive power to explore and exploit and those who
would prefer an Authority akin to a licensing body or registry.
This system, whose broad outlines are basically agreed upon,
would enable both the Authority and States parties, state enter1-1. United Nations Committee of Fisheries, U.N. Doc. COFL78/INF.8, (1978).

prises, or natural or juridical persons to explore and exploit the
Area. Negotiations are now focused on many of the essential details of this system.
It is clear that no "parallel system" can really exist if the Enterprise-the operating arm of the Authority--does not possess the
financial and technological capacity to explore and exploit the
Area effectively. Here a wide measure of agreement has been
reached on the need to ensure the proper functioning of the Enterprise within the system by the transfer of technology.
There is also a general consensus that the convention on the
law of the sea should provide for some mechanism to review, after
a certain period of time, the new system for regulating the exploration and exploitation of the Area. But there is still no agreement over what would happen to the existing system if no
agreement is reached at the Review Conference.
Another area where accommodation is necessary relates to the
decision-making processes of the Authority, in particular the composition and voting procedure in the Council. Some States, particularly from the Third World, relying on the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, maintain that the guiding principle
with respect to the composition of the Council should be that of
equitable geographical distribution and that there should be no
right of veto or weighted voting in the Council. Those States
which possess the technological capacity to explore and exploit
the Area take a different view. They contend that the composition
of the Council should assure adequate protection to the special
interests of States, especially their major economic interests, and
that decisions should be taken essentially on the basis of consensus. This issue is obviously of crucial importance and is indeed at
the heart of the proposed international legal regime for the deep
sea-bed.
Another problem which has surfaced at the Conference relates
to unilateral legislation, i.e. States enacting national maritime legislation on issues being dealt with by the Conference before the
proposed convention on the law of the sea has been adopted.
There are two types of legislation of concern here-the first category dealing with maritime areas which are essentially under national jurisdiction and the second dealing with the regulation of
activities in the sea-bed areas beyond national jurisdiction. As
has already been noted, several States have enacted national
maritime legislation with respect to the first category, particularly
on the exclusive economic zone. As to the second, some States
seem to be preparing to enact unilateral legislation on deep seabed mining.
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An important distinction can be made between these two cate-

gories of unilateral legislation. Whereas there has been a general
consensus on the concept of the exclusive economic zone, no such
consensus yet exists on the regime of the international sea-bed
area.
Those who claim the right to enact unilateral legislation on

deep sea-bed mining before the adoption of the convention argue
that under present international law the freedom to explore and
exploit the resources of the deep sea-bed constitutes one of the
freedoms of the high seas.1 2 In addition, they regard General Assembly resolutions on this matter as having no legally binding effect.
Others argue that, as far as the exploitation of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction is concerned, the international community was confronted with an absence of rules and it was the task
of the international community to fill that vacuum,13 and that the
resolutions have filled the void, so to speak, in the law.14 They
cite in particular General Assembly resolution 2749(XXV) of 1970,
which is the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and
Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
The latter argument relies on an important principle, namely
that international law, like all law, is a means of social control, a
means of regulating human activities. In that sense, where there
is no necessity for social control, no activity to regulate, it seems
otiose to speak of the existence of a legal norm. Indeed, it can be
argued that the regulation of the exploration and exploitation of
deep sea-bed resources remained outside the concern of international law as long as these resources were in fact not exploitable.
The object of the various resolutions on this matter, the Declaration of Principles, as well as of the protracted negotiations in the
Conference, is to bring these resources within the purview of an
international legal regime.
It must be observed that the wishes of the majority of the international community on the nature of an international regime of
12. See Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: InternationalConsiderations and Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO IL REV. 531, 535-41 (1979).
13. See 25 U.N. GAOR, First Committee (1777th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/P.V.
1765-1801 (1974) (statement of representative from Peru); P. RAo, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN RESOURCES 93 (1975).
14. P. RAO, supra note 14 at 88.

such fundamental and far-reaching importance should not be
lightly disregarded. 5 Nevertheless, the point must be borne in
mind that the "legal decision-making process cannot be indefinitely delayed and allowed to lag behind the technological and economic needs of the society."'6
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

One of the significant features of the developing new law of the
sea is the scope which it offers for international co-operation
among States themselves and between States and international
organizations. 17 There has already been established a network of
bilateral fishing agreements providing for the access of the fishing
vessels of non-coastal States to the resources of the exclusive economic zones of several coastal States. This type of international
co-operation will surely continue to expand.
It is clear that coastal States and relevant international organizations will have to co-operate in the maintenance of the living resources within the exclusive economic zones of coastal States and
that such organizations will have to be utilized to arrive at measures for the conservation of stocks both within and in areas beyond and adjacent to the exclusive economic zones of two or
more States. In addition, international organizations can be employed to promote technical assistance, especially to developing
countries, for the conservation and management of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone.
Of course the symbol of the highest form of international co-operation which the international community has yet aspired to is
the International Seabed Authority-an organization designed to
translate into reality the notion contained in the 1970 Declaration
of Principles that "the Area and its resources are the common
heritage of mankind." It should here be observed that President
Johnson, in his remarks at the commissioning of the research
ship, "Oceanographer," as far back as July 13, 1966, made this
point quite eloquently and in a sense ushered in the notion of the
common heritage of mankind18 in international maritime law
15. Cf. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's observations: "Whatever may be the content
of the recommendation and whatever may be the nature and circumstances of the
majority by which it has been reached, it is nevertheless a legal act of the principal organ of the United Nations which Members of the United Nations are under a
duty to treat with respect appropriate to a resolution of the United Nations." Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions
Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, [1955] LCJ. 57.
16. P. RAo, supra note 14, at 93.
17. Castafieda, La Zona Econ6mica Exclusiva y el Nuevo Orden Internacional, FoRo INTERNACIONAL, 12-13 (1978).

18. It was Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand who at the first plenary meet-
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when he declared that:
We greatly welcome this type of international participation. Because
under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of
rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to
grab and to hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the
deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human
beings.19

The objective of the Conference is the adoption of a "comprehensive convention dealing with all matters relating to the law of
the sea. . . bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are
interrelated and need to be considered as a whole." The nature of
this mandate has obliged States to look at the provisions of the
proposed convention in their entirety, in short, to adopt the socalled "package deal" approach. The structure of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text itself has further strengthened this
approach.
As has already been observed, the notion of consensus constitutes "another basis element of this Conference. The two elements-the notion of consensus and the "package deal"
approach-have influenced the Conference throughout its history.
Their role remains significant in the present crucial stage of the
Conference.
Finally what is of ultimate importance is that this proposed convention on the law of the sea can be of immense assistance in the
creation of a new maritime order. This is the measure of the importance of this Conference--one in which almost all States-the
rich, the poor, the "geographically privileged," the "geographically
disadvantaged," and the militarily powerful-are participating.

ing of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea seemed to have used the
term in a maritime context when he remarked that: 'The sea is the common heritage of mankind." It should also be noted that a cognate principle is embodied in
one of the preambular paragraphs of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which recognizes
"that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord." The principle of the common heritage of mankind is
also to be found in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Article 11 of that agreement states, inter alia,
that the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind.
19. Emphasis added.

